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Abstract
As the world financial crisis hit Europe in 2008, the financial shock had asymmetric
effects across the eurozone; by 2010, its effects led to a sovereign debt crisis in the euro
area. The shock created a clear distinction between strong, core economies in the European
Monetary Union (EMU), and a struggling indebted periphery that fared worse in the period
of crisis. The sovereign debt crisis revealed inherent fragility in the EMU. In light of recent
populist movements, the common currency is under unprecedented scrutiny. This study
seeks to assess the euro effect on exports for a clearly distinguished EMU core and
periphery. Using an econometric analysis, this paper will also determine if the euro effect
has changed, with respect to three time periods: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Through
this, the euro effect on trade can be better understood, as its benefits (in terms of trade
increase) will be identified for various groups that may weigh the costs of currency union
differently in post-crisis Europe. The results find the euro effect on total exports is about a
9.5-10.9% increase. However, it is found that most of the the euro effect on exports is seen
by the core. The euro effect on trade is negatively impacted by the sovereign debt crisis for
all EMU groups, but the core was the only group to have a euro effect that remained
positive during that period.
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I. Introduction
i. The Euro: Creation, Crisis, & Concern
The euro came into existence on January 1, 1999, just seven years after the
establishment of convergence criteria set forth by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The new
European Monetary Union1 included initially 6 countries, and has since expanded to a
union of 19 of the 28 current member countries of the European Union2. Once an EU
country meets the Maastricht convergence criteria, it is to further integrate by adopting the
common currency3. A currency union comes with economic benefits: namely, easier trade.
Through reduced transaction costs, a single currency may increase trade between member
countries. There are costs of joining the euro, however, with perhaps the greatest being the
loss of independent monetary policy. The official financial authority of the EMU is the
European Central Bank4, whose function is to safeguard financial stability and promote
European financial integration, but exercises control on the monetary regimes of member
countries (ECB, 2018).
Lack of fiscal discipline in periphery euro countries presented issues for the EMU
when the effects of the global financial crisis reached Europe in 2008. The financial shock
had asymmetric effects across the EMU. The transition to the sovereign debt crisis occurred
in 2009 when periphery countries reported large increases in debt to GDP Ratios, and
government revisions of the Greek deficit showed that the country had been falsifying its

1

Hereafter, “EMU”
See Appendix B for timeline of EMU accessions
3
Currency union “opt-out” granted to U.K, Denmark, and Poland
4
Hereafter, “ECB”
2
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deficit numbers (Lane, 2012). Rising yields on sovereign bonds reflected credit risk in EMU
periphery nations. Subsequently Greece, Ireland, and Portugal received a series of bailouts
from the EU and IMF in 2010 and 2011, with additional bailouts for Greece in 2012 and
2015. The shock created a clear distinction between strong, core economies in the EMU,
and a struggling indebted periphery that fared worse in the period of crisis.
The economic fragility of the EMU is not the only criticism. The global rise of
populist movements attack the foundations of European integration the EMU was founded
on. Sharing a common currency is just as much a political argument as it is economic, and
“nationalistic sentiments concern currency unions, not monetary unions in general”
(Visser, 2000). This is because a country’s physical currency may reflect a national identity.
In June 2016, the United Kingdom exited the European Union customs union, with
subsequent EU-UK trade negotiations take place this year. In the 2017 French presidential
elections, the anti-euro, anti-EU National Front party leader, Marine Le Pen, garnered
substantial momentum until her eventual loss to Emmanuel Macron. Coinciding with the
British exit are the terms “Frexit” (French exit), and “Grexit” (Greek exit). These countries
have received international media attention in regard to their position on staying within
the EU and EMU. In the U.S., “America First” populist rhetoric has been realized in trade
policy under the Trump Administration - with increased import tariffs on aluminum and
steel resulting in a pending trade war between the EU and U.S., and the U.S. and China. In
light of these global populist movements, international trade has come to the forefront of
economic policy, and the benefits of European economic integration are under
unprecedented scrutiny as euro members recover from the sovereign debt crisis nearly 7
years after its peak.
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ii. Research Questions
The effects of the world financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent Sovereign Debt
Crisis showcased the costs of joining the EMU, as asymmetric shock brought the EMU
periphery to its knees. Currency union literature focuses on the trade benefits associated
with joining the EMU, but considering the economic differences among EMU members, it is
imperative to find who realizes such benefits. By defining an EMU core and periphery that
reflect economic differences in the EMU, this study will address the following research
questions:

1) Who benefits more from the EMU, in terms of its effect on exports – the periphery or the
core?
2) How has the European debt crisis changed the impact of the EMU on core and periphery
exports?

iii. Structure
This paper will continue as follows: Section II will summarize economic theory
underpinning currency unions, and will outline recent empirical findings on the currency
union effect on trade, and more specifically, the euro effect on trade. Section II will
conclude with research that will serve as a basis for how this paper defines the EMU core
and periphery country groups. Section III will describe the Direction of Trade IMF dataset
the IMF World Indicators datasets used in this study. Section III will further provide
descriptive statistics and trade trends. Section IV will provide a brief introduction to the
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gravity model of trade, and then will introduce the regression model used in this study and
define the variables used in each model variation. Section V will discuss findings of the
regression model. Section VI will conclude the findings of this study and discuss next steps
in the EMU.
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II. Literature Review:
i. Overview of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Theory
The contribution of this study is to determine the currency union effect of the core
and periphery nations in the EMU. It is then imperative to review the economic theory
justifying currency unions and the benefits they yield for member countries. Robert
Mundell’s seminal paper, “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” explores the economic
underpinnings of currency unions, and the criteria by which one can be considered optimal
(Mundell, 1961).
A currency union, by definition, is a group of nations with one single currency and
one central bank with note issuing power. This implies that each member country forsakes
individual monetary policy. In a flexible exchange rate regime, independent monetary
policy enables a country to combat domestic inflationary and recessionary pressures from
demand and supply side shocks. Mundell (1961) explains this in the case of a demand shift
from goods of country A to country B, causing unemployment in country A and inflationary
pressure in country B. If prices do not rise in B to adjust the terms of trade, the full
adjustment of the shock falls on country A. In a currency union, the central bank has to
decide the extent to which to allow unemployment in deficit countries and inflation in
surplus countries. As Mundell argues, with the example of the U.S. and Canada, an optimum
currency union may be a region, not a country. Mundell (1961) emphasizes that an
optimum currency area has significant labor mobility, as it may serve as an adjustment
mechanism in the case of demand shock. In the case of demand shift from country A to B,
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labour will move from country A to country B, thus combating unemployment in country A
and inflationary pressure in country B.
Important additions to OCA theory have been made by Mckinnon (1963), who
asserts that factor mobility alone does not constitute an optimum currency union, but also
the economy’s openness to trade. Mckinnon (1963) argues that the more open an economy
is, the more affected its cost of living will be by changes in foreign prices; therefore, more
open economies have greater incentive to join currency unions because exchange rate
changes may not serve as an appropriate adjustment mechanism. Kenen (1969) finds that
product diversification is also crucial in an optimum currency area, as a demand shift from
country A to country B may may be combated through a change in production; if country A
can produce the goods of country B, this may also serve as an adjustment mechanism by
absorbing the job loss of goods from country B.
With these theoretical criterion in mind, a country considering union must weigh
the economic benefits of union, with the inherent costs of forsaking independent monetary
policy. The EMU project presented a unique challenge to OCA theory, as it joined eleven
large advanced economies under one central bank. Among its immediate criticisms was
that the EMU’s lack of fiscal stabilizers made the union inherently fragile, and that the area
did not comply with OCA theory criteria (James, 2012). Despite these objections, the EMU
presented an opportunity to further integrate the single market, and for member states to
benefit from reduced transaction costs in inter-European trade.

7

ii. Related Empirical Research on the Currency Union Effect on Trade
The effect of common currencies on trade was first seen in Andrew Rose’s early
paper, “One Money, One market: the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade,” which
assessed the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and common currencies on
international trade (Rose, 2000). His path-breaking study found that trade increases within
currency unions by a factor of three, all other things equal, and that the negative effect of
exchange rate volatility on trade is less significant. Rose’s findings were based on panel
data of bilateral trade observations for 186 countries, from the years 1970-1990. In light of
the then-recent formation of the EMU in 1999, Rose believed that his findings could reflect
trade benefits for the new eurozone, even though the set of eleven countries already
experienced low exchange rate volatility prior to the union (Rose, 2000). To capture this
relationship between currency unions and trade, Rose uses an augmented gravity model,
which serves as the basis for further literature on currency unions and trade, as well as the
empirical model this paper. In the gravity model, bilateral trade flows are explained by the
product of GDP between two countries, and by the distance between the two countries.
Rose (2000) augments this model with dummy variables for the following: contiguity,
common language, trade agreements, and colonial relationships between countries. This
model will be discussed in more detail in the Data & Methods chapter.
To address concerns in his first paper, Rose revisits the gravity model in his paper
“Does a Currency Union Affect Trade: the Time-Series Evidence” (Glick & Rose, 2002). In
this paper, written with Reuven Glick, they refocus their attention on a new policy
question: does adopting a common currency have an increased effect on bilateral trade?
This study uses a large annual panel dataset of 217 countries from year 1948 through
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1997. Analyzing changes in trade for countries that left currency unions during this period,
they find that adopting a common currency doubles bilateral trade between member
countries (Glick & Rose, 2002). This policy question is particularly relevant in the context
of the Eurozone, as the EMU significantly expanded throughout the 2000’s to western
European nations.
Rose’s work on the currency union effect has opened the discussion of the euro
effect on trade over the past two decades. The subsequent literature aims to reevaluate the
euro effect, while addressing concerns in the early work of Rose (2000) and Glick & Rose
(2002); the following studies have weakened Rose’s initial currency union effects, but have
upheld the finding that the euro has had a significantly positive effect on trade between
EMU members.
Analyzing the euro area within Rose’s framework, the effects of the early EMU on
trade were analyzed using a gravity model by Micco et al. (2003). During this time, the
benefits of the euro area were re-examined in light of the Greece accession in 2001, and
talks of further euro additions in the coming decade: Slovenia (2007), Cyrpus and Malta
(2008), and Slovakia (2009). A common criticism of Rose (2000) and Glick & Rose (2002),
is that their findings could not be directly applied to the EMU, as many of the currency
pairs were from currency unions developed by very small or very poor nations, which is an
unlikely comparison with the eurozone (Micco et al., 2003). To address this concern, Micco
et al. use panel data for bilateral trade from 1992-2002 for twenty-two developed countries.
Micco et al. find that the EMU positively increases intra EMU trade between 4-10%.
Additionally, Micco et al. found that the common currency positively affects trade between
members of the EMU and non-member countries; this effect on EMU/non-EMU trade is
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between 8-16%. This means that membership in the currency union not only boosted
bilateral trade between EMU members, but also between EMU members and their nonmember trading partners.
Barr et al. found an even more significant euro trade effect in 2003. Their study also
uses an augmented gravity model, but uses quarterly data for only EMU and EFTA nations
(11 EMU members, 6 non-members) from 1978Q1 to 2002Q1; additionally, in critique of
Rose (2000), their sample avoids using developing countries in analyzing the effects of the
euro. Their results find a 29% increase in trade for eurozone members (Barr et al., 2003).
Barr et al. use price and output co-movement averages from 1978 to 2002 as instrumental
variables to distinguish this increase in trade as a result of EMU membership, from a result
of a country’s propensity to enter the eurozone.
In contrast with previous works measuring bilateral trade flows, Bun & Klaassen
(2002) and Flam & Nordstrom (2003) use the dependent variable of bilateral trade exports
to analyze the currency union effect on trade. Bun & Klaassen find an increasing effect for
EMU to EMU exports over time: a 3.9% increase in 1999, 6.9% in 2000, and 9.6% in 2001.
They estimate a 37.8% increase in intra-EMU trade in the long run, with half of the longrun effect achieved in 2006 (Bun & Klaassen, 2002). Contrasting to Rose (2000), who found
a negative real exchange rate volatility effect on trade (although significantly smaller effect
than the positive currency union effect), Bun & Klaassen (2002) find the negative effect of
real exchange rate on exports to be statistically insignificant. In Flam & Nordstrom’s
(2003) assessment, they also find a positive effect of the euro on exports; in comparison
with their 1989-2002 benchmark, the euro increased trade between euro countries by 15%
on average for the period 1998-2002.
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These studies critically assess the euro trade benefit in light of the shortcomings
inherent in Rose (2000); they are better able to isolate euro effects by excluding many
small, developing nations, and include actual euro data post the 1999 currency
introduction. However, these studies use few years of actual EMU data. It is imperative to
review more recent findings, as the eurozone has matured and expanded throughout the
2000’s.
In more recent literature, the EMU effect on trade is still significant, and still found
to be smaller than Rose’s initial currency union effect: Baldwin and Taglioni (2007),
Baldwin et al. (2008), and Berger and Nitsch (2008) have all estimated the intra EMU trade
effect to be less than a 15% increase. Glick & Rose (2016) provide a much needed update to
their 2002 study to include 15 years of EMU data. In their paper, they agree with, and
statistically prove, the common criticism that the EMU is different than other currency
unions. Their 2016 paper uses trade data from 1948 to 2013. The study still uses data from
a vast number of small, poor, countries, but separates the euro effect from other currency
unions; they find that the EMU effect on trade is an estimated 50% increase. In defense of
their still-large, positive euro effect, Glick and Rose argue that studies narrowly focusing on
the euro effect (as opposed to other unions) include time trend effects for European
economic integration may mask the true effect of the euro on trade.
Since the euro’s inception in 1999 (and even before), there has been disagreement
in the economics literature as to the extent to which the EMU enhances trade flows
between member countries, as well as with non-member countries. Despite disagreement
on the extent to which the euro has impacted trade, the vast amount of literature on the
topic overwhelmingly suggests that there is a positive currency union effect on trade within
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the EMU, though it may be decreasing. The policy question behind most of this work is:
“should non-member countries join the eurozone?” As countries in other regions around the
world debate further economic integration, they weigh the benefits gained from one level
of integration to the next. Now, in a post-Brexit Europe, policy questions have shifted
toward the potential benefits of exit from one level of integration to the next. In answering
these questions, it is imperative to address how gains in trade may differ among countries.
Addressing a potential difference in trade increases among different groups, Egger &
Pfaffermayr (2002) are the first to address a European “core” and “periphery” and how
trade may differ within and between these groups. The paper finds the effect of EU
integration on trade flow between core and periphery trading blocs over the period 1960
to 1998. The paper defines the first six EU members as the “EU Core”(Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and the remaining members as the “EU
Periphery.” Using a gravity model, Egger & Pfaffermayr estimate the effect of EU integration
on trade flow throughout various phases of integration in three dimensions: intra-core
trade, core-periphery trade, and intra-periphery trade. Their results find that coreperiphery and intra-periphery trade have experienced stronger positive effects than intracore trade.
Glick (2017) focuses on the separation of the regional trade agreement effect of the
EU from the EMU effect on trade. For the EU and the EMU, he finds 70% and 40% European
trade export increases for older members, respectively. He finds even higher export boosts
for newer members, but argues that more time is needed to assess these gains in European
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trade5. Both Egger & Pfaffermayr (2002) and Glick (2017) provide insight as to how
European integration has affected trade differently for different groups within the EU and
EMU. Both papers define these groups by chronology of membership. In this thesis, I argue
that chronology of membership does not accurately reflect the core and periphery in the
EMU.
Much of the gravity model literature on the currency union effect on trade assesses
the size of two countries, the distance between them, and a host of other factors that proxy
for transaction costs of trade. However, it is imperative to keep in mind that trad between
two countries is largely influenced by history and culture. In Campbell (2008), he finds that
trade patterns are largely explained by culture and history, by analyzing habit persistence
in consumer preferences and learning-by-doing in production. Campbell uses the example
of chopsticks to explain that China may export chopsticks to Japan, not just because they
are geographically near to one another, but because Japan is “culturally preconditioned” to
eat with chopsticks. This cultural “pull” between these countries’ trade is therefore
influenced by culture. Campbell (2008) arguest that since China has been using chopsticks
for centuries, it is therefore more likely to have an advantage in the chopsticks export
market. This is an imporant consideration when looking at trade between various
European countries, and particularly as we group these countries in a core and periphery
reflective of currency union costs.

5

Older members defined as countries that joined EMU 1999-2001, and new members defined as post
2001 members
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iii. Defining an EMU Core and Periphery
In their seminal work pre-EMU, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) use data on
output and prices to analyze aggregate demand and supply disturbances for eleven
European Community countries using a VAR decomposition. They analyzed the coherence
of the shocks among member countries, as well as the speed of adjustment. In comparison
with US monetary union (regional data), they use EC shock data to find that disturbances
may have a more idiosyncratic effect in the proposed EMU than in the US. However, they
find a european core that experiences shock cohesion similar to the US: Germany, France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In contrast, they find that the United
Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece experience demand and supply shocks
in a larger and more idiosyncratic manner. Updating Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s seminal
work with real EMU data, Campos and Macchiarelli (2016) use the same methodology,
sample, and time span using data from 1989 to 2015 to find that this core-periphery divide
exists, but that the pattern has weakened post-EMU.
This study will use Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s study as a criterion for defining the
core and periphery within the EMU. The core will consist of the five countries: Germany,
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (excluding non-EMU Denmark). The
periphery will be defined as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece (excluding non-EMU
United Kingdom). This definition of an EMU core and periphery is reflective of two groups
that may consider the costs of monetary union differently, as they were expected (and did)
experience shock asymmetrically.
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iv. Defining Crisis
This paper not only seeks to determine the euro effect on exports for core and
periphery countries, but how that potential trade benefit has changed with respect to the
European debt crisis. This paper will define three crucial periods in the history of the EMU:
pre-crisis (1999-2007), crisis (2008-2012), and post-crisis (2013-2016). Phillip Lane’s
book, “The Sovereign Debt Crisis”, he defines three phases of the euro in regard to the
sovereign debt crisis, which we will use for the purposes of this study. While Lane (2012)
describes an “anticipated post-crisis” at the book’s 2012 publication, the 2013 to 2016
post-crisis phase will be further supported by historic events that suggest recovery in the
EMU from 2013 forward6.
Lane (2012) describes the pre-crisis era of the euro as one in which the growth
performance and relatively benign financial environment hid the potential of the crisis that
was to hit in 2008. In the 1999 to 2007 time period, low sovereign bond yields indicated
little credit risk among euro countries, although countries like Italy and Greece had
significantly increased their debt to GDP ratios since their introduction of the euro in 1999
and 2001, respectively. With the new ability of borrowing in their own currency, the euro
periphery experienced a credit boom; the periphery could now borrow without the worry
of exchange rates moving against them. At this time, periphery countries increased fiscal
deficits, while Germany experienced current account surplus. Lane (2012) provides insight
that the more intense phase of the credit boom did not start at the inception of the euro,

6

All information in Defining Crisis section is from Phillip Lane’s “The Sovereign Debt Crisis” (2012), with
exception of in-text citations and post-2012 historic information.
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but instead from 2003 to 2007; this difference is hypothesized to be related to the global
financial system and low, long-term prevailing interest rates.
The crisis period began in 2008, as the world global financial crisis took hold in
Europe. In response, the ECB lowered short-term rates and focused on euro-wide stability.
Lane (2012) notes that during 2008, investors withdrew from international markets, which
asymmetrically affected countries with the greatest reliance on international funding. The
global financial crisis drew attention to the large current account imbalances in the euro
area, and the credit boom of the pre-crisis era came to a halt. In 2009, high deficit-to-GDP
reports from Ireland and Spain signaled trouble in the periphery. In October of that year,
Greece announced revisions of previously falsely reported budget deficits. The transition
from global financial crisis to sovereign debt crisis was reflected in rising sovereign bond
yields in the EMU periphery.
After IMF/EU bailouts of Greece (May 2010 & March 2012), Ireland (November
2010), and Portugal (April 2011), it was clear that the euro area would require fiscal
reform to avoid future crises. In response to Lane’s (2012) anticipation of EMU reform, we
define the beginning of a post-crisis EMU with the establishment of such reforms: namely,
the Fiscal Compact. On January 1, 2013, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and
Governance in the Economic & Monetary Union came into effect. The main provision of the
treaty, the Fiscal Compact, required new fiscal provisions in domestic legislation; this
compact bound the nineteen euro members as well as Bulgaria, Denmark, and Romania
(European Commission, 2017).
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III. Data Description
i. Dataset Description
The dataset uses yearly trade data for the years 1992 to 2016 from the International
Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Export data is recorded on a free on
board (FOB) basis and Imports are recorded on a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) basis
(IMF, 2017). All trade data is converted from domestic currency to current U.S. dollars
using the highest available frequency of exchange rate available7. In Micco et al.’s gravity
model, a sample of developed economies is used to measure the Euro impact, as the EMU is
a unique currency union consisting of nineteen large, developed economies. For the
purpose of this study, data is pulled for advanced economies, as defined by the IMF World
Economic Outlook (IMF, 2017). Our dataset includes over 29,500 trade observations for 37
advanced economies. Some countries have been excluded due to insufficient GDP or trade
data8. Appendix B provides a table of all IMF advanced economies and their relative
economic size within this advanced economy pool. This dataset closely mirrors the
lifespan of the euro, with observations beginning in the year that the Maastricht Treaty was
signed. The dataset uses the most recent yearly trade data available through the IMF, thus
allowing this study to conduct the most recent analysis of the euro effect, including
seventeen years of EMU data.

7

All information regarding DOTS dataset is from the IMF 2016 Direction of Trade Yearbook, which
describes the IMF’s most current methodology of reporting and recording trade.
8
Puerto Rico and San Marino are excluded due to insufficient data.
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Yearly GDP data is used from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI) dataset. As defined by the World Bank, GDP is the sum of gross value added by all
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not
included in the value of the products. GDP for all countries is recorded in current U.S.
dollars, which is determined by converting domestic currencies using the official single
year exchange rate. Likewise, GDP per capita data is extracted from the WDI database, and
is recorded in current U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is measured by yearly recorded GDP
divided by midyear population.
Data on Regional Trade Agreements is from the World Trade Organization, and
includes all free trade agreements and customs unions between countries listed in our
dataset. The data will acknowledge an RTA between two countries starting in the year that
the RTA is in force as listed by the WTO, regardless of the month of year. All data used to
determine EMU membership for dummy variables is from Politico Europe, which lists
member countries by accession date.

ii. Descriptive Data
In its simplest form, the gravity model of trade says that trade between two
countries will be positively correlated with the product of the economic “size” of two
countries, and negatively impacted by the distance between them, due to transaction costs.
The dependent variable in this study will be measured in F.O.B. exports. Like prior studies,
economic size will be measured in terms of gross domestic product, and for use in the
regression model, the natural log of GDP as well as the natural log of GDP per capita
product will be used. Distance is measured by the natural log of the distance in kilometers
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between the exporting country and the importing country. Table 1 records the summary
statistics for the basic gravity model variables.
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Table 1. Gravity variables
Gravity
Variables

Min

Max

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Ln Exportsij

4.73

26.62

19.24

2.98

Ln GDPij

44.14

59.87

52.11

2.68

Ln GDP per
Capitaij

15.46

23.18

20.33

1.08

Ln Distance
(km)

4.12

9.88

8.09

1.09

Table 1 shows that within our advanced economy sample, the natural log of F.O.B.
exports has a mean of 19.24, with a large range of export values (4.73-26.62). As to be
expected when using an advanced economy sample, GDP per capita is defined within a
narrower range.
Prior literature on the gravity model of trade includes various dummy variables that
factor into trade decisions between two countries. It is likely that sharing a border
(contiguity) will cause higher trade, as transaction costs associated with shipping goods are
low between countries that are very close to one another. Further, a common official
language may influence trade, as different official languages may make trade more costly.
Another augmentation of the gravity model is the existence of a regional trade agreement,
which is defined by the WTO as an agreement between two or more countries, including
both free trade agreements and customs unions (WTO, 2018). Table 2 shows the frequency
of these characteristics, and their prevalence within our data.
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Table 2. Gravity Augmentations
Gravity Augmentations

Percent

Contiguity

4.83%

Common Official Language

10.88%

Regional Trade Agreement (RTA)

41.33%

Here, we see that a small portion, only 4.83% of our trade data consists of an exporter and
importer that share a border. Nearly 11% of the countries in our advanced economy
sample share a common official language. Of all advanced economy trade observations for
1993 to 2016, 41.33% consisted of trade between two countries with a free trade
agreement or a customs union.
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This study will focus on the currency union effect for periphery and core countries
in the EMU. To view the currency union effect on trade within the EMU, a dummy variable
is used to indicate if both the exporting and importing country are EMU members. Further,
a dummy variable is used for both the core and periphery to determine how the euro effect
may differ for core and periphery exports to EMU countries. Table 3 shows that of our
trade observations, 12.12% account for trade between two EMU countries. Core and
periphery exports to any other EMU country account for 4.0% of the trade data each.

Table 3. Currency Union Effect
Currency Union Variables

Percent

EMUi

30.3%

Intra EMUij

12.12%

Corei EMUj

4.00%

PeripheryiEMUj

4.00%
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IV. Methodology
i. Introduction of the Gravity Model
Originally brought into use by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model of international
trade is regarded as one of the most robust findings in economics. Based on Isaac Newton’s
law of gravitational attraction between two objects, the gravity model of trade indicates
that the trade flow between two countries is positively correlated with the size of their
economies measured by GDP, and negatively correlated with the distance between the two
countries. As mentioned in previous literature on the currency union effect, this model has
been augmented by dummy variables to measure the effect of other factors on trade: if two
countries share a common language, share a common border, are in a free trade agreement,
or in a currency union.
iii. Presentation of the Regression Model
All gravity models used in this study measure the effect of independent variables on
the same dependent variable -- the natural log of bilateral exports. In line with gravity
model convention, they include independent variables regarding the economic size
variables: natural log of GDP product and the GDP per capita product, as well as a distance
variable measuring the natural log of distance in kilometers between the exporting country
and importing country. Augmentations to the model include dummy variables for
contiguity, common official language, and the existence of a regional trade agreement of
any kind between the exporting country and importing country. All models include year
fixed effects to control for year-to-year trends in international trade.
The first gravity model used in this study, which we will call the Basic Model, is a
series of 3 regressions (i), (ii), and (iii) that focus on identifying a euro effect on trade and
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disentangling this effect for the core and periphery. Basic Model (i) is the simplest model of
the regressions, and focuses on determining the currency union effect on exports. As
previous literature finds, adopting the Euro may also increase trade with EMU countries
and non-EMU countries9. This regression will include dummy variable EMUi that
determines the euro effect on all advanced economy bilateral trade. EMUi takes the value of
1 for all exports from an EMU to any economy in the advanced economy pool. The effect of
the euro on intra-EMU trade will be determined by the dummy variable IntraEMUij that is
defined as 1 for all EMU exports to other EMU member countries, and as 0 for EMU exports
to non-EMU countries. Coefficient β8 will determine the additional percent boost in the euro
effect on exports that an EMU country gets when its trade partner also shares the euro. The
total euro effect on exports can be defined as the sum of coefficients for EMUi and
IntraEMUij.
Basic Model (ii) focuses on disentangling the effect of the euro on intra-EMU trade.
By adding dummy variables for the core and periphery, we will be able to tell how much
the euro effect on intra-EMU trade differs between the two groups, and the rest of the noncore, non-periphery, EMU. The dummy variable Corei EMUj is defined as 1 for all core
country exports to any other EMU member. The dummy variable Peripheryi EMUj is defined
as 1 for all periphery country exports to any EMU member country. These variables of
interest will tease out any differences in intra-EMU trade benefits between the core and
periphery of the EMU. The sum of β8 and β9 will determine the euro effect on intra-EMU
exports for core EMU members from. Likewise, the sum of β8 and β10 will determine the

9

Micco et al. 2003
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same effect for periphery EMU members. With core and periphery dummies, the variable
EMUij will tell us the intra-EMU trade boosts for non-core, non-periphery EMU countries.
Basic Model (iii) will further explore the early EMU findings of Micco et al. (2003),
who found that the euro boosts developed economy bilateral trade by 9% compared to two
countries who do not share the euro. In Model (iii), intra-EMU trade variables will be
excluded. In place of the intra-EMU variables of Basic Model (ii), Model (iii) will include
core and periphery dummies that will separate the euro effect of EMU to advanced
economy exports. Corei takes the value of 1 for all trade observations for which the
exporter is an EMU core member, and 0 for all other observations. Peripheryi will take the
value of 1 for all periphery exports to advanced economies, and takes the value of 0 for all
other observations.
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Basic Model
(i) Ln(exportsij) = β0 + β1ln(GDPij) + β2ln(GDPperCapitaij) +β3ln(distanceij)+ β4Contiguity +
β5Comlang+β6RTA+ β7EMUi +β8IntraEMUij δt + ε

(ii) Ln(exportsij) = β0 + β1ln(GDPij) + β2ln(GDPperCapitaij) +β3ln(distanceij)+ β4Contiguity+
β5Comlang+β6RTA+ β7EMUi +β8IntraEMUij + β9Corei EMUj+β10Peripheryi EMUj + δt + ε

(iii) Ln(exportsij) = Ln(exportsi) = β0 + β1ln(GDPij) + β2ln(GDPperCapitaij) +β3ln(distanceij)+
β4Contiguity+β5Comlang+β6RTA+β7EMUi + β8Corei+β9 Peripheryi + δt + ε

This paper will examine the currency union effect for the EMU core and periphery in
three distinct time periods: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Crisis is a dummy variable
defined as 1 for all years 2008 to 2012 and 0 for all years not defined within that period.
Postcrisis is a dummy variable defined as 1 for all years 2013 to 2016, and 0 for all other
years. The Crisis Model will use interaction terms for crisis and post-crisis time periods to
find any significant changes in the euro effect on trade for the entire EMU, the core, and the
periphery from the pre-crisis period of 1999-2007. The Crisis Model (i) will show changes
in the euro effect on exports for each period. Crisis Model (ii) will determine how the crisis
changed the effect on EMU to EMU trade for the core and periphery. Crisis Model (iii) will
show changes in the euro effect on EMU exports to all advanced economies for the core and
periphery.
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Crisis Model
(i) Ln(exportsij) = β0 + β1ln(GDPij) + β2ln(GDPperCapitaij) +β3ln(distanceij)+ β4Contiguity+
β5Comlang+β6RTA+ β7EMUi +β8IntraEMUij +β9(crisis*EMUi ) + β10(crisis*IntraEMUij ) +
β11(postcrisis*EMUi )+β12(postcrisis*IntraEMUij) +δt + ε

(ii) Ln(exportsij) = β0 + β1ln(GDPij) + β2ln(GDPperCapitaij) +β3ln(distanceij)+ β4Contiguity+
β5Comlang+β6RTA+ β7EMUi +β8IntraEMUij + β9Corei EMUj+β10Peripheryi EMUj +
β11(crisis*EMUi ) +β12(crisis*IntraEMUij ) + β13(crisis*Corei EMUj) + β14(crisis*Peripheryi
EMUj)+β15(postcrisis*EMUi) + β16(postcrisis*IntraEMUij) +β17(postcrisis*Corei EMUj) +
β18(postcrisis*Peripheryi EMUj) +δt + ε

(iii) Ln(exportsij) = β0 + β1ln(GDPij) + β2ln(GDPperCapitaij) +β3ln(distanceij)+ β4Contiguity+
β5Comlang+β6RTA+ β7EMUi +β8Corei + β9Peripheryi + β10(crisis*EMUi ) + β11 (crisis*Corei) +
β12(crisis*Peripheryi) + β13(postcrisis*EMUi) +β14(postcrisis*Corei) + β15(postcrisis*Peripheryi)
+δt + ε
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V. Results and Discussion
i. Regression Results
Table 4. Basic Model Regression Results
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Looking at Basic Model (i), we see, in line with gravity model convention, a
significantly positive effect of GDP product between the exporting country and importing
country, and a significantly negative effect of distance on trade. Gravity dummy model
augmentations of contiguity and common language also suggest a significant, positive effect
on exports. Exports are increased by 26.1% when two countries share a land border.
Surprisingly, a common language shared between two countries increases exports by over
100%. To explain such a large effect, we can review the common-language sharing
economies in our advanced economy sample. Among those are the U.S., Canada, and the
U.K. Taking the size of these economies into consideration, these three IMF country codes
accounted for a total of 45.8% advanced economy trade in 2017. A much smaller, european
example of a common official language in the sample is Germany and Austria. This large
effect does not differ greatly from the results of Micco et al. (2003), which found an 81%
increase in trade for common language countries, but it is important to consider that the
countries with the most economic weight in the sample happen to share the English
language.
Our findings suggest a 5.9% increase in exports to countries that share a regional
trade agreement, significant at the .1% level. The coefficient of EMUi tells us the boost in
advanced economy, non-EMU trade received from an exporter joining the euro. This tells us
that the euro currency will significantly increase trade by about 9.5%. This finding is in
support of Micco et al. (2003), who found a 9% increase in EMU to non-EMU, developed
economy trade. This is explained by the euro’s role in opening up economies to boost
international trade. Basic Model (i) also serves to distinguish the euro effect on intra-EMU
trade, as the currency should theoretically increase trade among members due to

29

decreased transaction costs. Here, we see that beyond gains from non-EMU advanced
economy trade, the euro will boost intra-EMU trade to the order of 1.4%, but it is not a
significant increase. This means that that in total, EMU countries will export about 10.9%
more to EMU countries than will non-EMU countries10. This means that the euro effect on
exports is similar, regardless of if the importing country is in the EMU or not. Our results
align with recent currency union literature that find a euro effect on intra-EMU trade to be
less than 15%, with the exception of Glick & Rose (2016), who find a 50% EMU increase. As
literature has been able to use more recent, actual EMU trade data, this currency union
effect has dwindled. Studies using real EMU data have found less than a 15% increase in
trade from EMU membership over the past decade. Also unlike Glick & Rose (2016), this
study only includes advanced economies in its sample, and uses a shorter time span that
reflects the life of the euro currency.11
Basic Model (ii) further disentangles the euro effect on intra-EMU trade. As
discussed in the results from regression (i), the euro boosts exports from EMU members to
non-EMU advanced economies by about 9.5%, all else equal, and the euro will boost trade
to other EMU economies by about the same. CoreiEMUj and PeripheryiEMUj tease out the
euro effect on intra-EMU exports for the core and periphery, respectively. In doing this, the
euro effect of the core and periphery will be isolated from non-core/periphery EMU
countries. Here, we see that non-core or periphery countries exporting to any EMU country
will experience a negative euro effect of about 5%, but the effect is not statistically different
from 0. A core EMU member exporting to an EMU country will increase exports by 19.7%.
10

Total impact of euro effect determined by the sum of EMUi and IntraEMUij coefficients. 9.5+1.4=10.9.
This is statistically different from 0 at the .01% level.
11
Glick and Rose (2016) observe trade flows from 1948 to 2013.
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The total impact of the euro effect on intra-EMU trade for the core is therefore a 14.98%
increase12. Contrastingly, the periphery experiences a negative effect of about half a
percent, but this finding is not statistically different from zero. These results suggest that
trade boosts in previous studies on the euro effect on intra-EMU trade may have been
concentrated in core trade, and not reflective of the currency union effect for the whole
eurozone.
Basic Model (iii) allows us to review the euro effect on exports to all advanced
economies, with our core and periphery dummy variables to tease out effects within the
eurozone. Looking at the gravity model variables regarding GDP and distance, we find them
all statistically significant, and relatively unchanged from Basic Model (i) and (ii).
Augmentations of contiguity and common language also have similar effects. However,
when looking at RTA, we see that the effect of two countries being in a regional trade
agreement with one another has both increased in magnitude and significance, with an
RTA increasing bilateral trade by 9.2%.
When looking at the variable EMUi in regression (iii), the coefficient tells us that
non-core, non-periphery, EMU countries have a 7.38% increase in advanced economy
exports. Corei tells us that core countries in the EMU have a euro effect 26.4% greater than
those that are non-core or periphery. Thus, the total impact of the euro effect on advanced
economy trade is 33.78%, significant at the .01% level. In contrast, the periphery will
experience a euro effect on advanced economy trade of 18.1% less than non-core or
periphery EMU countries. The total euro effect on advanced economy exports for the
periphery is an estimated decrease of 10.72%, significant at the .01% level.
12

Significant at the .01% level
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From these findings, it appears that the EMU benefits as a whole in terms of
advanced economy exports, as seen in regression (i). However, the EMU core countries gain
even more in terms of trade boosts than others; considering that the euro effect for the
periphery has a total negative effect on advanced economy exports. The explanation for
such differences can be attributed to the EMU exchange rate. As the currency union exports
increase, the demand for that currency (the euro) increases. When the demand for a
currency increases, it raises its value relative to other currencies. An appreciation of the
euro makes EMU goods more expensive, and thus more costly for other countries to
import. In the case of the euro periphery, a struggling economy may wish to devalue its
currency to make its goods cheaper, thus increasing exports. However, as a member of the
currency union, they are unable to do this. So although the euro impact on trade is
significantly positive, the negative effect on periphery country exports can be attributed to
their inability to control their exchange rate.
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Table 5. Crisis Model (i) Regression Results

Crisis Model (i) uses the same gravity variable augmentations as the Basic Model,
which are included in the table above. This table shows us the euro effect on exports
throughout the three periods of interest: pre-crisis (1999-2007), crisis (2008-2012), and
post-crisis (2013-2016). This regression is the most simple of the Crisis Model, and looks at
the euro effect on exports for all EMU members, without core or periphery distinction. This
model allows us to look at the general gains in trade assumed the whole EMU during these
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time periods. Models (ii) and (iii) will allow us to tease out these effects for core, periphery,
and all other EMU members.
The coefficient of EMUi tells us that during the pre-crisis time period, EMU members
had 21.6% more exports to non-EMU countries than exporters not in the EMU, all else
equal. The coefficient of IntraEMUij shows that there was no trade boost for intra-EMU
members, but that a common currency decreased the euro effect on exports by about
16.3%. This negative effect could be attributed to a lag in the effect of the EMU on intraEMU trade. The total euro impact on exports in the pre-crisis time period is about a 5.3%
increase for all EMU exports, which is significantly different than 013.
The crisis interaction terms will enable us to see changes in the euro effect from the
pre-crisis time period to the period of crisis, defined as 2008 to 2012. Here, we see that the
euro effect on EMU to non-EMU exports decreased by 32.2%. In contrast, EMU members
increased exports to other EMU members by 24.9%, compared to non-EMU to EMU
exporters. The total change in EMU exports during this period shows that the crisis period
showed a negative change in euro exports from the pre-crisis period by 7.4%, but is not
statistically significant. The total euro effect on trade in the crisis period is therefore
negative 2.1%, meaning that EMU member countries exported 2.1% less to all advanced
economies than did non-EMU members, although this finding is not statistically different
than 0.
Post-crisis interaction terms reveal the change in the euro effect on exports as the
world recovered from the world financial crisis, and the EMU recovered from the sovereign
debt crisis after 2012. Compared to the pre-crisis time period, the EMU still had a negative
13

Significant at the .1% level.
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impact on EMU to non-EMU exports, but is significantly less negative than that of the crisis
period, which signifies a recovery from the crisis14. Looking at the euro effect on intra-EMU
trade, the post-crisis period shows a promising change of 34.4% from the pre-crisis era.
The total post-crisis change in the euro effect on trade from the pre-crisis to crisis is a
positive 22.3%. From this, we can determine that the total impact of the euro on exports is
27.6%. This euro effect on exports in the post-crisis period is significance tested at
the .01% level.

14

Significant at the .01% level.
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Table 6. Crisis Model (ii) Regression Results

Now that we have found the changes in the total euro effect on exports in different
time periods, we can tease out these effects for the core and periphery EMU countries, to
answer the question: who benefits the most from the euro, and when? To unpack this,
Crisis Model (ii) will focus first on intra-EMU exports. Crisis Model (ii) shows the
coefficients and robust standard errors for the variables of interest. Gravity model and
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augmentation variables are included in the regression but excluded from the table15. The
first four variables focus on the euro effect in the pre-crisis time period. The coefficient of
EMUi will denote the euro effect on exports for all EMU countries to non-EMU countries.
Intra-EMUij denotes the euro effect on EMU exports shared by non-core/periphery EMU
countries during the pre-crisis. Corei EMUj and Peripheryi EMUj coefficients will determine
how much the core or periphery euro effect on EMU exports differed from that of the noncore/periphery EMU country group16. The interaction terms on the next set of 8 variables
will determine how the euro effect has changed during the crisis and post-crisis periods,
relative to the pre-crisis period.
Here, the EMUi coefficient shows a 21.8% increase in EMU exports to non-EMU
countries during the pre-crisis period, which is relatively unchanged from the results of
regression (i). The non-core/periphery country group, here determined by the coefficient
of IntraEMUij , appears to export 12.7% less with other EMU countries than do countries
that are not in the eurozone during the pre-crisis period. In comparison, the core trades
about 5% more with the EMU than the non-core/periphery, although this finding is not
significant, and still shows a total negative euro effect on trade with EMU members. The
periphery is found to export about 12.9% less with the EMU than the non-core/periphery
group, totaling an impact of negative 25.6% for the periphery in the pre-crisis period. So
while Crisis Model (i) finds a negative effect on intra-EMU trade, it is clear that these
negative effects are concentrated in the periphery.

15

Excluded from table: ln(GDPij), ln(GDPperCapitaij), ln(distanceij), Contiguity, Comlang, RTA. All
statistically significant at the .01% level, except RTA which is significant at the .1% level.
16
For example, coefficient for Intra EMUij will determine non-core, non-periphery euro effect when
core/periphery variables are included. The Corei EMUj coefficient is then the core group’s difference from
that change. Total Core impact for that period is the sum of both Intra EMUij and Corei EMUj coefficients.
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The crisis interaction term variables indicate changes in the euro effect on trade
from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. As indicated in Crisis Model (i), the crisis
period showed a significantly positive change for the euro effect on intra-EMU trade,
although the total euro effect on exports was null for that period. Crisis*Intra-EMUij shows
that the change for non-core/periphery countries showed nearly a 1% increase, but is not
significant. However, Crisis*Corei EMUj and Crisis*Peripheryi EMUj show positive change in
the euro effect on intra-EMU trade for the crisis period, to the effect of 42.1% and 32.1%
for the core and periphery groups, respectively. These changes are not significantly
different from one another. From this, we see that the crisis period presented a time when
the core and periphery both experienced similar gains in intra-EMU trade boosts from the
euro, while non-core/periphery countries did not. However, the total euro effect on intraEMU exports for the crisis period shows that an inequality still exists in the currency union
effect, despite equal gains between the core and periphery. In the crisis period, the core
exports an additional 35.6% to EMU countries than non-EMU countries do17. The periphery
exports 7.5% more than non-EMU countries, and the non-core/periphery group exports
about 11.8% less in the crisis period, all else equal. However, we can only attest that the
core experiences a significant effect.
As determined by Crisis Model (i), the post-crisis period shows a significant increase
in the total euro effect on exports from the pre-crisis time period. As seen in (i), most of this
positive euro effect is from gains intra-EMU exports. The post-crisis interaction terms allow
us disentangle this effect. From the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period, the noncore/periphery countries had a positive change of 27.8% in the euro effect on intra-EMU
17

Significant at the .01% level.
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exports. The coefficients of postcrisis*Corei EMUj and postcrisis*Peripheryi EMUj tell us that
the core and periphery experienced a change about 7% and 11% higher, respectively, but
that they do not statistically differ from the 27.8% change seen in non-core/periphery
countries. In total, the non-core/periphery group exported 15.1% more to EMU countries
than non-EMU countries did18. The core exported 27.62% to other EMU countries than did
countries not in the eurozone19. The periphery shows an intra-EMU trade boost of 13.5% in
the post-crisis period, but is not statistically different than 020.

18

Sum of coefficients IntraEMUij+postcrisis*IntraEMUij significant at the .05% level.
Sum of coefficients IntraEMUij+Corei EMUj + postcrisis*IntraEMUij+Postcrisis*Corei EMUj . Significant at
the .01% level.
20
Sum of coefficients in the same fashion as core calculation.

19
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Table 7. Crisis Model (iii) Regression Results

Crisis Model (iii) allows us an overview of the entire euro effect (EMU to non-EMU
and EMU to EMU) on exports for the core and periphery. All gravity model variables and
augmentations used in previous Crisis models are included in the regression but excluded
from the table. Using the same method as Crisis Model regressions (i) and (ii), interaction
terms will allow us to distinguish significant changes in the euro effect from the pre-crisis
period to both the crisis and post-crisis time periods. The variables EMUi, Corei, and
Peripheryi determine the euro effect for non-core/periphery countries, core countries, and
periphery countries, respectively. Interaction terms will denote changes from the pre-crisis
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period for stated variables. The results of this model focus on the total euro effect for each
EMU group, and how it changes during each time period.
The pre-crisis euro effect for non-core/periphery country group is a positive 38.5%,
meaning that this group will export 38.5% more to advanced economies (both EMU and
non-EMU) than will non-EMU countries. The total euro effect for the core group in the precrisis period shows a negative 3.13% coefficient, which means that it trades about 35.2%
more to advanced economies than non-EMU countries, but is not statistically different from
this 38.5% non-core/periphery euro effect. The periphery, however, will export about 10%
less to all advanced economies than non-EMU countries in the pre-crisis period21.
The crisis period shows significant change in the euro effect across all three groups.
Non-core/periphery countries experienced a 59.7% change from the pre-crisis to crisis
period, for a total euro effect of negative 21.2% in the crisis period22. The core and
periphery coefficients show that these groups fared significantly better than the noncore/periphery group during the crisis (in terms of total euro effect change), but were still
negatively impacted. The total euro effect for the core group during crisis is a 28.97%,
compared to its 35.2% effect in the pre-crisis period23. The total euro effect on exports for
the periphery in the crisis period is a negative 24.7%, compared to its negative 10% effect
in the pre-crisis period.24 Here, we see that the core still experiences a positive euro effect
on exports while the rest of the EMU has a significantly negative impact.

21

0.385+(-.484) = -0.099. This effect is significant at the .01% level.
Significant at the .01% level.
23
SIgnificant at the .01% level
24
Significant at the .01% level
22
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In the post-crisis period, we see change of negative 24.3% for the noncore/periphery country group, for a total post-crisis impact of 14.2%25. For the core
country group, the total change in euro effect is a 2.1% increase, which accounts for a total
euro effect on exports of about 37.5% in the post-crisis period 26. The total change in euro
effect for the periphery from pre-crisis to post-crisis is a positive 14.9%, which determines
a total post-crisis euro effect of 5%27. However, this total crisis impact is not statistically
different from 0.

25

Significant at the .01% level.
2.1% increase determined by sum of postcrisis*corei and postcrisis*EMUi. The 2.1% increase is not
significantly different than zero. This means that the total euro impact in post-crisis period is not
statistically different than pre-crisis euro effect.
27
The increase of 14.9% in total euro effect for the periphery is significant at the .01%.

26
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V. Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to add to the literature on the currency union effect
on trade, by examining the effect of the euro and how a positive “euro effect” on exports
might 1) differ for certain groups within the currency union who have shown
macroeconomic differences since the euro’s inception, and 2) how the recent world
financial crisis and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis may have impacted this
effect. Our study finds that there is a significant euro effect on exports to advanced
economies - around a positive boost of 9.5% for all advanced economy exports - and about
a 10.9% for EMU to EMU countries, although these increases do not statistically differ from
one another. So therefore, there are two components of the total “euro effect” on exports.
From our 1992 to 2016 dataset, we find that although the EMU as a whole does not
experience a significant intra-EMU trade boost, the core does. The EMU core will export
about 15% more to EMU countries than a non-EMU member will. When looking at the total
euro effect on all advanced economy trade, it is clear that the core appears a clear winner
again. The EMU core will export around 34% more to advanced economies than a non-EMU
member would, all else equal. In contrast, the periphery will export 10.72% less to
advanced economies than a non-EMU member would. This can be explained by exchange
rates. When the EMU as a whole is exporting more, the demand for the euro increases.
When the demand for a currency increases, it raises its value relative to other world
currencies. An appreciation of the euro makes EMU goods more expensive for other
countries to import. When some countries (like the core) experience positive trade, others
may not. The periphery may wish to devalue its currency to make its goods cheaper to
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increase exports, but in the case of a common currency, it cannot control its exchange rate.
Thus, the negative effect on all advanced economy trade for the periphery is explained by
its inability to control its exchange rate. In both intra-EMU and non-EMU, advanced
economy exports, the core benefits more from the euro.
Is this euro effect on trade impacted by the sovereign debt crisis? In short - yes. But
how does it change, and for whom? This study first looks at intra-EMU trade. The core and
periphery both experience a negative euro effect on EMU exports in the pre-crisis period,
although the periphery experiences this to a much greater degree. In the crisis period, the
core shows a significantly positive euro effect on EMU exports of 35.6%. The periphery
shows a positive effect of 7.5%, but the effect is not significantly different from 0. Postcrisis, the core has euro effect on intra-EMU exports of about 27.62%, while the periphery
still does not show a significantly positive impact on exports to EMU countries. From this,
we see that the core experienced a larger euro effect on Intra-EMU exports during the
crisis, and maintained most of that effect post-crisis. The periphery did not show a positive
intra-EMU trade boost relative to non-EMU countries, but showed increase in intra-EMU
trade from the pre-crisis period. In terms of all advanced economy trade, the core,
periphery, and non-core/periphery countries experienced similar trends in the euro effect
on all advanced economy trade. From pre-crisis to crisis, the euro effect decreased. From
crisis to crisis, the euro effect on exports increased.
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V. Limitations & Future Research
Although our dataset provides the most recent analysis of the euro effect on trade,
with 18 years of euro trade data, recent accessions to the eurozone are still difficult to
analyze. The original members account for the core and periphery groups of this study,
with the exception of Greece joining two years later in 2001. However, the noncore/periphery group changes over the life of the euro as new countries are ushered into
the currency union. For this reason, our study is limited in its analysis of noncore/periphery countries that have recently introduced the euro.
Another limitation of this study is in the selection of core and periphery countries.
The study of Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1993) provides insight into how a proposed EMU
experiences supply and demand shock, which may influence how a country perceives the
economic costs of currency union. My definition of the core and periphery sought to align
the economic costs of currency union with the economic benefit (in this paper, increased
trade); however, this particular grouping of countries groups the strongest econonomies in
the eurozone and the weakest. Further, this study does not control for trade patterns
between country pairs, which may also play a role in the currency union decision, as
countries that are already trading a lot with one another may be more motivated to share a
currency.
Lastly, and most importantly, this study’s analysis of the euro is solely economic.
The primary limitation of this study is that although economic literature may influence a
country’s currency union decision, politics play a significant role. A politicial persepctive of
the benefitcs of EMU member memebership for core and periphery countries before,
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during , and after the sovereign debt crisis woud be benefical in providing a compehensive
analysis of the euro. Further, this study uses historic trade data to determine how euro
countries may view the euro benefits in the future. This may be supplemented with future
research in political sentiment between the core and periphery countries to determine how
countries may regard the euro and their future within the currency union.
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B. Appendix
Table 8. EMU Accession by Date
Date

Country/Countries

January, 1 1999

Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain

January 1, 2001

Greece

January 1, 2007

Slovenia

January 1, 2008

Cyprus and Malta

January 1, 2009

Slovakia

January 1, 2011

Estonia

January 1, 2014

Latvia

January 1, 2015

Lithuania

*Source: Politico.eu, 2015. EU members not in the EMU are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden
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Table 9. IMF Advanced Economies & Percent total GDP, Exports, and Population of
Advanced Economy group
Advanced Economies

GDP

Exports of Goods
and Services

Population

U.S.

37.0%

16.6%

30.5%

Euro Area (19)

28.1%

41.2%

31.9%

Japan

10.4%

6.1%

12%

U.K.

5.5%

5.6%

6.2%

Canada

3.3%

3.6%

3.4%

Other Advanced
Economies (16)

15.6%

26.9%

16.0%

* Source: IMF, 2017. Percentage values are of total for Advanced Economy group. Other advanced economies:
Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Israel, Republic of Korea (South), Macao SAR, New
Zealand, Norway, Puerto Rico, San Marino, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan Province of China. Note
that People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North) is not a member of the IMF and therefore is excluded. As
noted in the paper, San Marino and Puerto Rico are excluded from this study.
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Table 10. Variable Descriptions
Variable

Description

ln(Exports)

Natural log of Free on Board (FOB) exports recorded
in U.S. dollars

ln(GDPij)

Natural log of product of gross domestic product for
export countryI and import countryJ in U.S. dollars

Ln GDP per CapitaiJ

Product of GDP per capita of export countryI and
import countryJ in U.S. dollars

ln(Distance)

Natural log of distance (km) between export and
import country

Contiguity

1 If export and import country share a border

RTA

1 If export and import country are in a regional trade
agreement: including free trade agreements and
customs unions (EU)

Common Official
Language

1 if both export and import country share a common
official language

EMUi

1 if export country is a member of the European
Monetary Union (EMU)

Intra-EMUij

1 if export country and import country are members
of the EMU

Corei

1 if export country is defined as EMU “Core” country

Peripheryi

1 if export country is defined as EMU “Periphery”
country

CoreiEMUj

1 if export country is defined as “Core” and import
country is (any) member of the EMU

PeripheryiEMUj

1 if export country is defined as “Periphery” and
import country is (any) member of the EMU

